Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalist Party began administering Taiwan on behalf of the Allied Powers, led by the United States, beginning in late October 1945. In December 1949, Formosa became the only home of the Chinese Nationalist Party. In that year, China’s civil war between Chinese Nationalists and Communists ended with the establishment of the PRC and the ouster of the Chinese Nationalists from Mainland China. The Chinese Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, remained in Taiwan, where they continued to administer the island for the Allied Powers as the ROC.¹

From the outset, American forces maintained military control over Formosa, even while giving Chiang Kai-shek’s government wide latitude to govern. In a December 1949 Memoranda to the Secretary of State, Senator Alexander Smith observed that:

In a June 6, 1949, internal memorandum, the Department of State similarly stated that “juridically Formosa is still under the sovereignty of Japan to which it was ceded by China in 1895.”³

Congress understood the purview of the ROC to be purely administrative. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations submitted a Report to Congress in 1955 observing that:

American diplomatic officials similarly understood Taiwan to be unambiguously under American control. In a 1949 letter to Paul Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (“ECA”), Roger D. Lapham, the chief of the ECA mission to China, wrote urgently from Taiwan in anticipation of the fall of the ROC in mainland China. Mr. Lapham suggested from Taiwan that the ECA and the State Department appoint a Governor to separately administer Taiwan instead of continuing to rely upon the ROC. Mr. Lapham observes that “I have been informed by military authorities that the loss of Formosa would be a severe blow to our [American] chain of island possessions.”⁵ Likewise, Mr. Lapham shares his concern than “To go into Taiwan with a feeble program would, of course, be throwing away the American taxpayer’s money completely.”⁶

Indeed, a significant amount of American taxpayer money was committed, along with U.S. personnel, to rebuilding the economy and responsible governance of Taiwan. The U.S. Government likewise expended considerable resources rebuilding the economy and industries of Taiwan. An August 1951 staff report to the Senate Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee described the extensive role American resources played in rebuilding Taiwan through the Economic Cooperation Administration (“ECA”):

The high level of economic involvement from the American agency was deemed appropriate because, “[t]he entire problem requires consideration and effective action. It would seem that under the circumstances the United States is entitled to bear a hand in steering the course of the ship of state.”⁸

A more extensive American military occupying presence was avoided not because of concerns regarding the legality of any such military presence or occupation, but principally because relying upon the administration and military of Chiang Kai-shek to govern the island as an agent of the U.S. Government better served American economic and strategic military considerations. In December 1949, the American counselor to the U.S. Embassy in Nanking wrote to the Secretary of State that:

Upon making the decision to allocate military and economic resources thusly, the Truman Administration balanced conflicting considerations of their duty as the occupying force in Taiwan with the political desire to send a message to the international community that they would not use their position as occupier of Taiwan to turn the strategically important territory into a zone of influence. General MacArthur, a supporter and admirer of Chiang Kai-Shek, pushed the administration to engage more directly with the ROC commander. The Truman administration took a decidedly more conservative approach, acknowledging only when absolutely necessary their continuing status as the occupying force in Formosa.

However, even a subdued American military presence was a significant presence. In a January 4, 1950 conversation between Congressman John Kee, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee and Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Jack McFall, Mr. McFall described of the American military presence in Taiwan in the wake of the establishment of the PRC on the mainland:

As the perceived need arose, General MacArthur understood the role of American forces in Taiwan as one fulfilling a responsibility to secure the island and other Japanese territories against any attack. In a statement made upon return from a “reconnaissance” trip to Taiwan, the General observed:

Ten days later, General MacArthur issued another statement, making clear that his trip to Taiwan dealt with “the problems of preventing military violence to Formosa, as directed by the President – the implementation of which directive is my responsibility.”¹³

On June 27, 1950, with the threat of American engagement in Korea looming, President Truman told the American people that the American forces on Taiwan were positioned to ensure and, if necessary, compel compliance of the ROC with the directives’ of the Allies. President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. President Truman stated: “I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland.” Making clear that this directive was a command and not a request, President Truman added that “[t]he 7th Fleet will see that this is done.”¹⁴ As for the legal status of Taiwan, President Truman observed that “[t]he determination of the future status of Formosa [Taiwan] must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”¹⁵

The next day, the ROC Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh officially accepted the President’s command, stating that:

Barely a month later, the United States’ 13th Air Force additionally set up liaison offices in Taipei.¹⁷

Any strategic ambiguity undertaken by the Truman administration during this period was solely in response to the demands of the larger international political climate. There was no confusion as to the status of the ROC as an agent in Taiwan of the United States. As memorialized in an internal memorandum, the President communicated his position on Formosa thusly, in conversation with General MacArthur:

During the same period, in an August 27, 1950 letter to Ambassador Warren Austin, President Truman described the status of the Chinese Nationalist government thusly:

The United States government was similarly clear that Taiwan was not a territory to be jettisoned. A December 5, 1950 meeting between Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Senator James Webb, and various State Department officials, the Secretary of State summarized his meeting with President Truman the previous day:

Later in that conversation, Secretary of State outlined the Truman administration’s proposals with regard to tensions in Korea as shared with British Prime Minister Atlee:

Importantly, on May 4th, 1951, as reported by the New York Times the following day, General Douglas MacArthur had occasion to articulate for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the exact status of Taiwan. In testimony given in a Committee hearing, General MacArthur stated:

General MacArthur’s ability to speak for the administration and issue authoritative statements on American foreign policy at that time is underlined by the Truman administration’s handling of General MacArthur. While the Truman administration took no issue with this particular section of General MacArthur’s characterization of the legal status of Taiwan, the President took General MacArthur’s public statements very seriously, paying attention to any of the General’s statements that ran afoul of the administration’s position given that General MacArthur’s statements could stand “as an authoritative US statement.”²³

Likewise, in April 1951, when the ROC requested that the United States transmit an invitation to the Japanese Government to establish an overseas agency in Taipei, the State Department was concerned that the establishment of an Agency might “imply Japanese recognition of the Chinese National Government,” but reasoned that such an objection was not worth pursing since the status of any such agency would be “inferior to that of a consulate,” and thus not inappropriately imply recognition of the ROC as a sovereign government.²⁴

This position of the United States government remained unaltered after the entry into force of the SFPT. In 1955, United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated:

Sheng v. Rogers, a lawsuit in the D.C. Circuit, Oct. 6, 1959, is informative. During the conduct of that case, the judges examined the legal status of Taiwan in detail, and held: " . . . that the Government of the Republic of China exercises authority over the island; that the sovereignty of Formosa has not been transferred to China; and that Formosa is not a part of China as a country, at least not as yet, and not until and unless appropriate treaties are hereafter entered into. Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China."